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On Target? The Israeli Supreme Court and the
Expansion of Targeted illings
Israel has used "targeted killings" against suspected terrorists since the al-
Aqsa intifada began in September 2000. By the end of 20o5, almost 300
terrorist organization members and 150 civilian bystanders had been killed in
targeted killings, in addition to hundreds of civilians wounded.1 The policy has
received wide international condemnation 2 and has sparked vigorous debate
among scholars about its lawfulness. After four years of consideration,3 the
Israeli Supreme Court recently weighed in with the world's first judicial
decision on targeted killings in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Government of Israel (PCATI). In PCATI, the court held that terrorists are
civilians under the law of armed conflict and thus are lawfully subject to attack
only when they directly participate in hostilities.4 But the court also expanded
the traditional definition of "direct participation" and the time period during
which civilians may lawfully be attacked. By disregarding the "direct
participation" requirement's important evidentiary function, the court
weakened the protections that international law affords to all civilians, not just
to terrorists.
1. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov't of Isr. (PCAT1) [Dec. 11, 2005]
slip op. para. 2, available at http://elyon.court.gov.il/FilesENG/o2/69o/oo7/a34/
0200769o.a34.pdf.
2. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Spokesman for Sec'y-Gen. Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General Urges Israeli Government To Cease Targeted Assassinations, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/7878 (July 5, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2o0/
sgsm7878.doc.htm.
3. The case was first filed on January 24, 2002. PCATI, slip op. para. 14. Proceedings were then
stayed between February and December 20o5 because Israel suspended targeted killings. Id.
4. Id. para. 26.
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION
The international law of armed conflict, principally enshrined in custom,
the Hague Convention,' the Fourth Geneva Convention,6 and the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I), 7 prohibits
deliberate attacks on civilians' but does not give them total immunity from
attack. Rather, international law embraces a balancing of military necessity
against the rights of the individual.
This balancing is primarily effectuated through the principle of
distinction- an "intransgressible principle[] of international customary
law"9-which obliges belligerents to distinguish between combatants and
civilians. Article 51(3) of Protocol I provides that civilians enjoy immunity from
deliberate attack "unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities."1 The debate over targeted killings has centered on whether
suspected terrorists are civilians or combatants and, if they are civilians, what
constitutes the "time" of their "direct" participation in hostilities. The
authoritative International Committee of the Red Cross Commentary on
Protocol I suggests that a civilian may directly participate in hostilities by using
a weapon, carrying a weapon for use in hostilities, or "undertak[ing] hostile
acts without using a weapon." 1 In an expert opinion in PCATI, scholar
Antonio Cassese suggested that in addition to a person engaged in combat, a
civilian "engaging in a military deployment" preceding an attack is directly
participating if"he carries arms openly during the military deployment."12
5. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Fourth Hague
Convention), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277.
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
7- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
8. Id. art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26.
g. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257
(uly 8).
lo. Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
11. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 para. 1943
(Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY], available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebList?ReadForm&id=47o&t=com.
1z. Antonio Cassese, Expert Opinion on Whether Israel's Targeted Killings of Palestinian
Terrorists Is Consonant with International Humanitarian Law paras. 12-13,
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The Israeli Supreme Court, however, took a broader view. As a threshold
matter, the court held that the law of international armed conflict applies to the
Occupied Territories 3 and that Article 51(3) of Protocol I binds Israel as
custom. 4 It also held that terrorists are civilians and therefore may be attacked
only while taking a direct part in hostilities, 5 subject to the customary
international law requirement of proportionality.16 The court then set out a
novel and expansive definition of "direct" participation, encompassing all
civilians "performing the function[s] of combatants." 7 It defined these
functions to include not only bearing arms before, during, or after an attack-
the limits identified by the Red Cross and Cassese-but also providing services
to unlawful combatants and participating voluntarily as a human shield. s
Further, the court included the actions of terrorist leaders in holding that direct
participation "should not be narrowed merely to the person committing the
physical act of attack"; instead, "[t]hose who have sent him, as well, take 'a
direct part'. The same goes for the person who decided upon the act, and the
person who planned it."'
9
To give practical effect to its expansion of "direct participation," the court
also expanded the traditional understanding of the "for such time" requirement
in Article 51(3). If "for such time" were limited only to the time preceding,
during, or following an attack, then many terrorist organization members
covered by the court's definition of direct participation -particularly terrorist
leaders- could never be attacked.2" The court redefined the outer bound of "for
such time," stating that
a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his
'hom6', and in the framework of his role in that organization ...
commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them,
loses his immunity from attack 'for such time' as he is committing the
http://www.stoptorture.org.i/eng/images/uploaded/publications/64.pdf (last visited May
1, 2007).
13. HCJ 769/02 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. paras. 16, 21, available at http://elyoni.court.
gov.il/Files ENG/o2/69o/oo7/a34/ 02007 69o.a34.pdf.
14. Id. paras. 20, 30.
15. Id. para. 26.
16. Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 57(2)(a)(iii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
17. PCATI, slip op. para. 35.
18. Id. paras. 34-36.
ig. Id. para. 37.
20. Cf. Cassese, supra note 12, paras. 14-15.
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chain of acts. Indeed, regarding such a civilian, the rest between
hostilities is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility.'
Because the court did not temporally limit the "chain of acts" committed or
specify a maximum duration for "short periods of rest," a target could
theoretically be attacked during rest periods lasting days or even weeks -far
longer than under traditional conceptions limiting "for such time" to the
period (usually hours) immediately surrounding an attack.
II. THE EVIDENTIARY FOLLY OF THE MEMBERSHIP MODEL
As the first authoritative judicial treatment of targeted killings, PCATrs
expansion of "direct" participation and its loosening of the "for such time"
requirement are likely to influence others analyzing targeted killings, including
the United States-the only state besides Israel to conduct targeted killings
openly.22 But PCATrs interpretation of Article 51(3) -a fundamental provision
protecting civilians in armed conflict -may be applied beyond targeted killings
to other armed conflicts where Article 51(3) applies, and it may thus
dangerously weaken civilians' protections.
As noted above, the court broadened the definition of direct participation to
include those who decide upon or plan attacks and send attackers. 3 This
position seems reasonable given that a narrower reading of direct participation
would leave low-level terrorist organization members subject to frequent attack
while immunizing terrorist leaders simply because they did not carry weapons
on missions. 4 But the court also took a broad view of when terrorists are
"taking a direct part in hostilities," thereby expanding the temporal horizon for
lawful attacks.
Under the court's definition of "for such time," the military is no longer
required to ask what the terrorist is doing at the time that he is targeted, but
only whether he is still an active member of a terrorist organization.s The
military does not have to show that the target poses an immediate threat
21. PCATI, slip op. para. 39.
22. For discussion of the 2002 U.S. targeted killing of Qaed Seynan al-Harithi in Yemen, see
Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, The Opening Shot, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 2002, at 48.
23. PCATI, slip op. para. 37.
24. See Cassese, supra note 12, paras. 12-15 (providing a narrower interpretation of "direct
participation").
25. Because terrorist organizations do not issue membership cards, the military might have
difficulty proving that an individual is a member. (But it will be even more difficult for a
suspected terrorist to prove that he is not a member.)
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rendering the use of force necessary26- that is, a threat so imminent as to allow
"no choice of means and no moment for deliberation."27 Thus, a terrorist may
be permissibly targeted for weeks instead of for the hours immediately
surrounding a terrorist attack.
In accepting a membership-based model, the court erred in treating the
"for such time" requirement as merely a timing issue rather than as an
evidentiary matter. Its interpretation thereby destroys the temporal nexus
between lawful attack and the threat posed by the target. International law
traditionally has interpreted "for such time" narrowly to include only
preparation, participation, and return from an attack. 8 This narrow reading
assures that the target poses an immediate threat (the timing of the attack
signals the proximity of the threat) and is therefore consonant with the
customary principle of distinction, which allows civilians to be harmed only
when they pose a threat. But under the court's expansive reading of "for such
time," direct participation provides no evidence that the target poses an
immediate threat that cannot be thwarted without force. The court's
interpretation thus provides the armed forces with a low evidentiary safe haven
to justify targeted killings: if they can prove that the target is an active terrorist
organization member, direct participation and an immediate threat are
presumed.
The disagreement over Article 51(3)'s scope is analogous to the larger
debate over preventive uses of force. While some support a state's right to use
force preventively to remove a non-imminent threat that might develop in the
future,' 9 others contend that international law permits only a narrower right to
anticipatory self-defense (i.e., to counter an attack that is certain and
imminent) .3' The greatest concern regarding the preventive use of force is the
difficulty of proving that a threat exists and that it cannot be neutralized by
26. The customary international law standard of necessity is typically defined using language
employed by Secretary of State Daniel Webster when he wrote to a British emissary to
protest the burning of an American ship, the Caroline, by British troops. See R.Y. Jennings,
The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938).
27. Id. (quoting Webster).
28. See, e.g., ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note iI, para. 1943.
29. See, e.g., THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23 (20o6),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/20o6/nss2o6.pdf (preserving the possibility
of using force "before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of
the enemy's attack"); John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563
(2003) (redefining imminence to justify preventive war).
30. See, e.g., Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L.
599 (2003).
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non-forceful means.' While in anticipatory self-defense, the imminence of the
attack is evidence that force is necessary, in preventive uses of force, the lack of
an imminent threat is evidence that the use of force may be unnecessary.32
As the international legal community has resisted shifting to preventive
action writ large,33 so should it resist shifting from anticipatory to preventive
force in the realm of targeted killings, and for many of the same reasons. The
preeminent concern in both contexts is that allowing self-defense against non-
imminent attacks will lead to uses of force that are not necessary. In the broad
use of force context, force may not be necessary because diplomacy remains
feasible, through either negotiation or sanctions; in the targeted killing
context, the targeted killing may not be necessary because arrest or negotiation
could be feasible. The guarantee to the military that targeting a terrorist
organization member will carry a presumption of threat, leading to a
presumption of necessity, may cause the military to engage in more targeted
killings that do not satisfy the international legal standard for necessity.
Additionally, moving away from the evidence provided by a narrow reading of
"for such time" may increase the likelihood of "collateral damage." If terrorist
organization members may be targeted even when they are not preparing for or
conducting an attack, then they will more frequently be targeted while
surrounded by civilians who are not directly participating in hostilities. Thus,
31. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 16 (2003) (arguing that self-
defense justifies force "only where there is sufficient evidence ... not only of the possession
of weapons but also of an intention to use them"); W. Michael Reisman & Andrea
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self -Defense, 1OO AM. J. INT'L L. 525,
526 (2006) (arguing that in moving from reactive to anticipatory to preemptive self-defense
the "interpretive latitude of the unilateralist becomes wider, yet the nature and quantum of
evidence that can satisfy the burden of proof resting on the unilateralist becomes less and
less defined and is often . . . extrapolative and speculative"); Miriam Sapiro, Preempting
Prevention: Lessons Learned, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 357, 367 (2005) ("The further a
decision to use force moves away from the requirement of imminence, the more likely the
possibility of a mistake.").
32. Cf Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 435, 442-43 (A. Cassese ed., 1986)
(contrasting international reactions to Israel's 1981 preventive strike on Iraq's nuclear
reactor and to Israel's anticipatory use of force against Egypt in 1967).
33. See, e.g., U.N. HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THREATS, CHALLENGES & CHANGE, A MORE SECURE
WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY paras. 188-91, at 54-55, UN Doc. A/59/565 (2004)
[hereinafter A MORE SECURE WORLD], available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/
report.pdf. Such resistance is visible in the widespread condemnation of the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power:
International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, loo AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 104-05 (2006);
Sapiro, supra note 31.
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civilians who could not themselves be lawfully targeted may inadvertently
become the victims of targeted killings.
Finally, the international system in the post-World War II era has worked
hard to prohibit unnecessary, nondefensive uses of force. The prohibitions of
the use of force in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and the human rights rules
against arbitrary deprivation of life34 both espouse goals of decreasing violence
but also recognize self-defense exceptions based on necessity. Decreasing the
evidentiary threshold for necessity in the international arena or in the context
of targeted killings - as the Israeli court's decision arguably does - may lower
the historic international legal standard for necessity. The Israeli court's laxer
definition of necessity may be exploited by other states in other contexts to
justify force against non-imminent threats at progressively earlier stages of
conflict. If the accepted standards begin to slip downward, then the likelihood
that states will undertake unlawful uses of force may increase: what state
would have the moral fortitude to be the last adherent to a strict definition of
necessity? A definitional slippage may precipitate a race to the bottom for an
important legal standard, resulting in the resort to force at earlier stages of
conflict.
The Israeli Supreme Court's recognition of the requirement of
proportionality between harm to civilians and military necessity does little to
remedy these concerns. Although the court accepted proportionality as a
limitation on targeted killings,3" its expanded definition of direct participation
hampers a proportionality analysis. Because, according to the court, active
membership is equivalent to direct participation, all terrorist organization
members are now "proper military objectives" for targeted killings. Thus, a
lower standard for threat now justifies the use of force, adding weight to the
military's side of the balance against individual rights. The likelihood of
collateral damage will increase because the military will now perceive a terrorist
organization member who is not engaging in an attack to be a legally
cognizable threat, and it will balance that threat -though it is not imminent -
against the civilian harm that a targeted killing would cause. In other words,
although the threat is less immediate, a military advantage will be perceived
that could trump the likely harm to civilians, even when no lawful military
advantage would have existed under the previous standard.
34. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, cl. 1, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
35. HCJ 769/o2 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. para. 45, available at http://elyoni.court.
gov.il/FilesENG/o2/69o/oo7/a34/ 0200769o.a34.pdf.
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III. IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
PCATI will likely be influential in shaping the international legal rules on
targeted killings. Although the court's opinion is not binding outside Israel, it
has taken years for any court to adjudicate the issue of targeted killings. It is
unlikely that any party would have standing to challenge targeted killings
before the International Court of Justice, 6 and any such challenge before a
U.S. court would likely be ruled a political question or decided in view of the
President's power as Commander in Chief rather than on the merits of the
international legal claims.3 7 The immediate consequence of the court's decision
will be to legitimize more targeted killings by the Israeli government, 3s but the
long-term consequences of the court's novel interpretation of Article 51(3) are
potentially even more problematic.
Some may argue that the narrow interpretation of "for such time" has
become outdated in the war on terrorism, but this argument lacks foundation.
The principle of distinction was codified in Protocol I in 1977 as a response to
decolonization movements and nationalist struggles, some of which employed
terrorism.39 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict-in which terrorism has been a
recurring issue -was a paradigm case for the application of Protocol I when it
was promulgated.4 ° The claims of necessity that the Israeli government has put
forth to justify changing the legal standards are not new arguments, and the
legal standards for protection of civilians that it protests are far from
outmoded. Indeed, asymmetrical warfare was exactly what the legal rules were
designed to address.
The Israeli court's quandary was how to reach terrorist leaders without
undermining public order and longstanding restrictions on the use of force.
Ideally, the law would allow strikes on terrorist leaders but would still limit
such strikes to periods during which the leaders pose an imminent threat. One
could argue that leaders pose a threat sufficient to justify attack when they
meet with terrorist organization associates, discuss attack plans, or give orders.
36. The International Court of Justice only has jurisdiction over disputes between consenting
states; thus, another state would have to bring suit against Israel or the United States, which
presumably would not consent.
37. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, ci. 1.
38. The implications of an increase in targeted killings are outside the scope of this Comment.
For discussion, see Kristen Eichensehr, On the Offensive: Assassination Policy Under
International Law, HARV. INT'L REV., Fall 2003, at 36.
39. Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 1(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7.
40. Cf George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
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But given intelligence limitations, such precise timing could be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve.
Alternatively, attacks on terrorist leaders could be required to satisfy an
extremely strict proportionality requirement. To illustrate, if ten innocent
deaths would normally be "proportional" to the targeted killing of one terrorist
leader, the allowance could be lowered to five, or to two, in recognition of the
fact that the threat posed by the leader, though grave, was not imminent.
Compared to the broad interpretation the Israeli court gave to the "for such
time" requirement, either of these alternatives would better account for the
realities faced by Israel and the potential for damage to international law in
lowering the legal standards for the use of force.
CONCLUSION
The Israeli Supreme Court should be applauded for addressing an
extremely complicated and contentious issue, and one that other judicial bodies
are unlikely to address. But the court's definition of direct participation,
coupled with its broadening of the "for such time" requirement in disregard of
that requirement's evidentiary function, threaten to undermine international
law's protection of civilians in armed conflict by shifting the balance toward
military advantage and increasing the likelihood of collateral damage. Justice
Barak emphasized the rule of law throughout his opinion. Perhaps echoing
Justice O'Connor's "blank check" line in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,4' he wrote: "There
is always law which the state must comply with. There are no 'black holes."' 42
But states must not be allowed to change the law in order to comply with it.
KRISTEN E. EICHENSEHR
41. 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("[A] state of war is not a blank check for the
President....").
42. HCJ 769/02 PCATI [Dec. 11, 2005] slip op. para. 61, available at http://elyoni.court.
gov.iVFilesENG/o2/69o/oo7/a34/ 0200 7 69o.a34 .pdf.
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